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The Impact of the Gig-Economy on U.S. Labor Markets: Understanding the Role of
Non-Employer Firms using Econometric Models and the Example of Uber
Fabien Rozzi
Technische Universität München
Abstract
In this work, I provide quantitative responses to the questions of how the size and the growth of the gig-economy can be
measured and how labor markets respond to the exposure to online platforms using data on non-employer firms from the U.S.
Census Bureau and on the staggered market entry of Uber in different U.S. metropolitan areas. I find that non-employer firms
experienced a growth by 60 % between 1999 and 2014 adding almost 9 million non-employer firms to the U.S. economy. I
show that non-employer firms are tightly linked to the rise of independent work and are highly effected by the emergence
of online platforms. Uber triggers an increase of 20 percentage points in non-employer firms relative to employment in the
transportation sector 4 years after entering local labor markets. Furthermore, Uber’s market entry is associated with a 0.05
- 0.07 increase in non-employer share in the transportation sector. I demonstrate that the growth of non-employer firms
between 2005 and 2014 is correlated with the growth in alternative work arrangements measured at the industry and state
level by Katz and Krueger. I find that the rise of non-employer firms is not mechanically driven by differential industry or
regional growth and that the number of gig-economy workers are at highest where unemployment is at highest. My results
highlight the impact of the gig-economy on labor markets and provide evidence that the use of non-employer firms is relevant
for measuring the gig-economy.
Keywords: Gig-Economy, Online Platform Economy, Labor Market, Non-Employer Firms, Uber
1. Introduction
“An approximate answer to the right question is
worth a great deal more than a precise answer to
the wrong question.” - John W. Tukey
Technology and the emergence of online platforms have
changed the way in which people work, enabling a variety
of on-demand services and creating new digital task mar-
ketplaces. Workers are able to earn income from their time,
expertise or effort through platforms such as Uber, TaskRab-
bit, Handy or Lyft.
These online platforms facilitate matching and direct
transactions between customers and labor force bringing
birth to a major socio-economic trend falling into a range
of activities known as the “gig-economy”. The gig-economy
is a technology-influenced evolution of work that has called
into question nations’ core beliefs about the work place in
society and how to best divide responsibility among workers,
businesses, and government.1 Understanding the prevalence
1Cf. Smith and Page (2016).
and implications of the gig-economy can help states and
governments develop policies and support the communities,
the businesses, and the workforce of tomorrow’s labor mar-
kets. But the questions of how to measure the exact size
and growth of the gig-economy have plagued researchers for
years.
This work intends to provide quantitative response us-
ing information on non-employer firms combined with the
case of Uber and state-of-the-art econometric techniques to
help address certain shortcomings of administrative data and
measure labor activity in the gig-economy. In the following
introduction, I picture the origin of my motivation based on
previous research, and describe my approach to address the
hypotheses I drew up on the current issues related to the gig-
economy.
1.1. Motivation and Related Work
A growing number of American workers earn income out-
side of traditional employee-employer relationships through
self-employment and business ownership. According to the
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5282/jums/v3i2pp33-56
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U.S. Department of Treasury, 16.8 million individuals re-
ported having earned a profit and paid self-employment tax
in 2014, representing a 32 percent increase from 2001.2
The almost 17 million self-employed workers represented 12
percent of all tax filers with earnings. A study from Farrell
and Greig (2016) shows that the number of individuals using
online-labor platforms has increase 54-fold since 2012 reach-
ing a 0.4 % of the U.S. workforce. These individuals derive
one third of their income from online platforms, and even
more so when their non-platform income drops.3 Why do
individuals increasingly use these online platforms? Is this a
structural trend? Are platforms increasing total labor supply
and lowering unemployment, or simply shifting individuals
from traditional jobs to online platform jobs? And how well
suited is the existing tax records data to accommodate and
measure this evolution, are all still open questions.
There has been much research on the rise of the so called
“gig-economy”, a state of work enabled by online platforms
and characterized by temporary positions filled by indepen-
dent contractors on a short-term basis.4 However, existing
observations provide little evidence of the true significance
and manifestation of this alternative work arrangement on
labor activity.5 Accurate measurement of the gig-economy
is important for understanding current labor market trends.
These trends have important implications for the income,
health insurance coverage, and retirement security of self-
employed workers. Fox (2014) argue that existing surveys
and administrative data are not well suited to capture new
forms of labor, and hence cannot be used to address these
questions.
On the one hand, it is hard to clarify the sector and its
meaning due to the changing nature of work, worker’s rights
and the controversy about legal, fiscal and social aspects of
services provided via online platforms.6 On the other hand,
its size and impact has been difficult to measure due to the
complexity of the concept, the relative recent developments
and the limited amount of available data on employment of
the gig-economy.7 Public institutions are not in a position
to gather data and the U.S. government stopped surveying
“contingent workers” after 2005, which means that no com-
prehensive database exists on workers in the gig-economy.8
Katz and Krueger (2016b) using a new dataset from the Cen-
sus Bureau argue that all of the net employment growth in
the U.S. economy between 2005 and 2015 can be attributed
to the rise of independent work.9 This has resulted in a de-
bate over the true significance of this new form of work re-
2Cf. Jackson et al. (2017).
3Cf. Farrell and Greig (2016).
4See among others Hall and Krueger (2015); Katz and Krueger (2016a);
Burtch et al. (2016); Gierten and Spiezia (2016); Hathaway and Muro
(2016); Harrigan et al. (2016); Codagnone et al. (2016); Chen et al. (2017);
Jackson et al. (2017).
5Cf. Codagnone et al. (2016).
6Cf. Codagnone et al. (2016).
7Cf. Hathaway and Muro (2016).
8The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has announced to resume the sur-
vey of contingent workers to be published in 2017.
9Cf. Katz and Krueger (2016a).
lationship. On one side, some critical claims utilizing aggre-
gate self-employment statistics conclude that evidence of a
revolution is hard to find and some proponents, on the other
side, working with company data or proprietary information
captured size and impact at a national level. 10
It appears however that inconspicuous data made avail-
able by the Census Bureau on “non-employer firms“ in com-
bination with self-employed statistics and company data can
shed additional light on the gig-economy and how the entry
of online platform influences labor markets.
1.2. Objectives and Approach
The objective of this thesis is to understand the origins
of the rise of the gig-economy, its impact on labor markets,
and the role of non-employer firms. In order to achieve
these overarching objectives, this work is pursuing a subset
of goals.
After unveiling the nature of the gig-economy and deter-
mining its stakeholders, characteristics, and the current im-
plications in labor markets, the first goal is to provide record
of the rise of non-employer firms as an integral part of the
gig-economy and a clear testimony of their suitability to be
considered a proxy for alternative work arrangements. This
can be achieved with administrative data on non-employer
firms made available by the U.S. Census Bureau, and data
on contingent workers captured by the U.S. Bureau of La-
bor Statistics (BLS) as well as in a recent survey lead by
Katz and Krueger (2016b). Comparing the rise of alterna-
tive work arrangements with non-employer firms using ordi-
nary least squared methods will help identify the relevance
of non-employer firms in the gig-economy.
The second goal of this work is to provide an understand-
ing of the effect of online platforms on non-employer firms
and extend findings to a relevant level for labor markets. The
aim is not to quantify the precise evolution and growth of in-
dependent work inside the gig-economy, but rather deliver
evidence of an apparent movement of non-employer firms in
online gigging due to the exposure to online platforms. To
do so, I use the paradigmatic case of Uber’s geographical ex-
pansion in the U.S. at commuting zone level and draw on
data published in a company report. Estimating the change
in non-employer firms with differences-in-differences tech-
niques will aid understanding the role of non-employer firms
and the impact of online labor-platforms by metropolitan
area.
The final sub-goal of my thesis builds on the previous
parts of my analysis on non-employer firms by measuring la-
bor supply elasticities to changes in the exposure to online
platforms. In particular, this is carried out in two stages: first,
I investigate how the change in non-employer firms varies in
state and industry by decomposing the growth accordingly.
And secondly, I consider non-employer-firms and the stag-
gered entry of Uber in different areas in the U.S. to esti-
mate the associated employment response using data from
10Cf. Burtch et al. (2016).
F. Rozzi / Junior Management Science 3(2) (2018) 33-56 35
the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS). I perform
this analysis for firms in industries that have been particu-
larly impacted by online platforms, such as the taxi and the
passenger ground transit industries.
This work also aims at providing evidence of the sig-
nificance of non-employer firms to assessing further socio-
economic issues arising from the evolution work in the gig-
economy. It will, in turn, help understand the gig-economy’s
impact on labor market activity at geographical and indus-
try specific levels. The purpose of these sets of analyses is
to reflect on how future studies should be considering non-
employer firms to assess how the dynamics in independent
work relates with working relationship, contractors’ situa-
tion, and other aspects of labor markets.
1.3. Indications and Hypotheses
As many studies have been dealing with the question
how to measure the gig-economy, this work uses a sparsely
tapped and valuable source of data to give an approximate
but meaningful answer. Knowing that most non-employer
firms are self-employed individuals reporting incomes from
an unknown source irrespective of whether or not they hold a
job, it appears the suspicion that they could shed light on the
rise of the gig-economy. At this point, the research question
that needs to be addressed is how to provide evidence that
non-employer statistics is a suitable piece of data to compen-
sate the scarcity of information on alternative work arrange-
ments that represent the sole available element on labor sup-
ply in the gig-economy.
My first assumption states that non-employer firms can be
used as a proxy for alternative work arrangements. In order
to verify this assumption, I draw up the following hypothesis
followed by the corresponding null hypothesis.
H1: Non-employer firms increase more in states/sectors
where the increase is largest in alternative work
data from 2015 Katz and Krueger compared to
CPS CWS data from 2005.
H0: There is no increase in non-employer firms
in states/sectors where alternative work arrange-
ments’ increase is the largest.
Before any further research utilizing non-employer statistics
is carried out on the impact of the gig-economy, the ques-
tion that one shall pose is how can be shown that the data
is relevant and to what extent is it impacting gig-work. This
is why the next essential part of this work is to test the rele-
vance of non-employer firms for the gig-economy by assess-
ing the effect of Uber as a practical example of an online gig-
platform, which at the same time shall estimate the magni-
tude of impact on local labor markets. My assumption is that
non-employer firms are a relevant proxy for alternative work
arrangements and an integrated part of the gig-economy af-
fected by the emergence of online labor-platforms.
H1: Non-employer firms increase more in metropoli-
tan statistical areas or counties where Uber en-
ters the market.
H0: There is no increase in non-employer firms
after Uber’s market entry
Having verified the relevance of non-employer firms as a
proxy for alternative work arrangements and given evidence
of alignment with other research, I would like to take advan-
tage of this data to analyze the impact of the change in non-
employer firms on labor market supply in the gig-economy.
My third presumption is that the gig-economy is canni-
balizing jobs within same industries or within same states,
which I wish to verify by testing the following hypothesis.
H1: The change in non-employer firms from the
taxi industry is different from the change in non-
employer firms from other industries after Uber
comes into the market.
H0: The change in non-employer firms from the
taxi industry is comparable to the change in other
industries after Uber enters the market.
Finally, I expect the gig-economy to contribute to a decline
in unemployment and not to take away jobs from employer
firms. This can be investigated with the hypothesis stated
below.
H1: The change in non-employer firms varies
with the levels and changes in unemployment.
H0: The change in the share of non-employer
firms has no effect on the unemployment rate
Testing these sets of hypotheses will help understand the
role of non-employer firms as an integrated part of the gig-
economy and the impact of online labor-platforms on labor
market activity on geographical and industry specific levels.
2. Setting: The Rise of the Gig-Economy and Implications
for U.S. Labor Markets
As indicated in the introduction, this thesis’ setting ad-
dresses the labor implications of the so-called gig-economy
also known as the sharing economy, the collaborative econ-
omy or the on-demand economy.11 As it is often not clear
what these terms refer to and what forms of working activ-
ities and entanglements are induced by this fairly new eco-
nomic phenomenon, the following chapter has the major ob-
jective to put all relevant implications of labor activities into
perspective of the gig-economy and demarcate the scope of
this work.
2.1. The Online Platform Economy or the Gig-Economy?
Online platforms allow people to work and make money
through the intermediary of a digital service handling issues
such as customer matching and payment resolution. Despite
11Cf. De Stefano (2016); Kessler (2015); Katz and Krueger (2016a).
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outward similarities in how these services look and operate,
they encompass a wide range of behaviors and characteris-
tics. A young professional who occasionally smoothens his
income by renting out his apartment on Airbnb is much dif-
ferent from a blue-collar who works for a ride-hailing service
in between other obligations. And each of these examples is
in turn vastly different from sites like Addeco that connects
businesses with highly skilled freelance workers or eBay that
offers an online-market for goods.12 Ultimately, a clear dis-
tinction between online platform economy and gig-economy
is necessary. An overview of selected online platforms is tab-
ulated in appendix Table 1.
The online platform economy encompasses all economic
activities involving an online intermediary that provides a
platform by which independent workers or sellers can sell
discrete services or goods to customers and facilitates peer-
to-peer transactions.13 The literature distinguishes two sub-
areas of the online platform economy.14 The first is character-
ized by capital platforms, such as eBay or Airbnb, which con-
nect customers with individuals who rent assets or sell goods
peer-to-peer. And the second subarea, which is understood
as the gig-economy, is marked by labor platforms, such as
Uber or TaskRabbit, connecting customers with freelance or
contingent workers who perform discrete projects or assign-
ments. This definition of labor platforms is consistent with
the definition asserted by Harris and Krueger (2015) and the
McKinsey Global Institute (2016), which describes the gig-
economy “as an online marketplace for contingent work in
which online platforms facilitate the sale of personal tasks”.
15
The gig-economy is understood to include two types of
work: “crowdwork” and “on-demand work”.16 Crowdwork
is defined as work executed through the internet, connecting
customers and workers, which both can either be organiza-
tions or individuals, on a global basis. It is also referred to as
online labor markets (OLMs), which allow the remote deliv-
ery of electronically transmittable services such as the devel-
opment of a website, the creation of a logo or various other
tasks that can be crowdsourced.17 In on-demand work, jobs
are assigned through a mobile application and are related to
more traditional low skilled work activities such as transport,
cleaning, or delivery. It is referred to as mobile labor markets
(MLMs), where the matching and transaction processes are
digital but the delivery of the services is physical and requires
direct local interaction. One of the major differences among
these two areas of the gig-economy is that crowdwork jobs
can be executed anywhere in the world while on-demand
work matches online supply and demand that are executed
locally.18 Accordingly, considering these two parts together
12Cf. Telles (2016).
13Cf. Becker & Rajwani (2016).
14Cf. Harris and Krueger (2015); McKinsey Global Institute (2016).
15This definition is used by Farrell and Greig (2016).
16Cf. De Stefano (2016).
17Cf. Codagnone et al. (2016).
18For more details on the dissimilarities and other features of the sub-areas
of the gig-economy see De Stefano (2016).
in a common analysis can be perilous. Because the study ob-
ject of this work implicates only local level labor market, the
part of the gig-economy related to crowdwork is excluded.
The distinction between the gig-economy and sharing
economy is that a gig-economy can encompass work that has
nothing to do with digital applications or intermediary plat-
forms, while the sharing economy exists within the virtual
world. For example, a worker who holds several part-time
jobs – possibly offering driving services through a digital ap-
plication, working at a coffee shop, and playing in a band
– is participating in the gig-economy but not necessarily in
the sharing economy.19 They would be considered as par-
ticipating in the sharing economy if any of these gigs were
facilitated by a digital application provided by an intermedi-
ary platform.20
2.2. Worker Classification and Labor Markets in the Gig-
Economy
By definition, individuals earning money through online
labor-platforms such as Uber are not employees of those
companies and are not listed on official forms. The lines
between employment classifications in the gig-economy are
very blurry. In order to analyze its implications thoroughly, I
must first settle on the definitions of gig workers and other
types of independent workers.
At the highest level of classification, the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics (BLS) lumps non-traditional workers under the
banner of contingent work which enclose all those who do
not expect their current job to last, i.e. those who work on
an non-permanent or temporary basis and those who have al-
ternative work arrangements, i.e. those who do not have an
implicit or explicit contract for ongoing employment.21 Addi-
tionally, the BLS includes the following as alternative employ-
ment arrangements: workers employed by a temporary help
agency, by a contract company, on-call workers, freelancers
or independent contractors. An employment arrangement
may be defined as both contingent and alternative, but this
is not automatically the case because contingency is defined
separately from the four alternative work arrangements. In-
dependent contractors are individuals who report they obtain
customers on their own to provide a product or service as a
contractor, independent consultant or freelancer.22 On-call
workers report having certain days or hours in which they
are not at work but on standby until called to work. Tem-
porary help agency workers and contract firms workers are
paid by help agencies and contract firms.
Other studies use broader definitions, like a 2015 pa-
per published by the U.S. Government Accountability Office
that included both self-employed individuals not included in
19Cf. Becker & Rajwani (2016).
20CF. Farrell and Greig (2016).
21Cf. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005).
22Independent contractors and freelancers are synonyms. While the term
independent contractor would be used to designate the tax and employment
class of this type of worker, the term freelancing is most common in culture
and creative industries.
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the BLS surveys and part-time workers. The OECD refers
to non-standard work (NSW), which excludes full-time per-
manent employment and includes self-employed, temporary
and part-time workers.23 Still other studies have included
those people who utilize contingent work and freelancing to
supplement their income from regular employment. This is a
broader definition that indicates both independent and salary
work without distinguishing, which job is primary and which
is secondary. 24
Implicitly, these nontraditional workers are self-employed
individuals all of which have existed long time before the rise
of online service platforms. An individual is self-employed if
the longest job held during the previous year was self- em-
ployment; or if the longest job held during the previous year
was wage and salary and they report some self-employment
income from other work.25 They engage in a wide variety of
economic activities, providing contract or consulting labor,
earning non-platform-based or gig-economy income. Many
earn income from both wages and self-employment work ar-
rangement. 26
The BLS’ preferred term, contingent worker, aligns well
with that definition of the gig-economy. However, it refers to
temporary forms of uncontracted employment that have ex-
isted long before the emergence of online platforms. To un-
derstand how the characteristics and activities of gig-workers
have changed over time, I provide a categorization of indi-
viduals with earnings from non-standard work arrangements
based on the source of earnings, and whether the individ-
ual engages on online-platforms. Using these criteria, I can
identify selected groups of gig-economy workers with similar
characteristics (see equations below).
Gig Worker =
(
Temporary Contractors
:
Independent Contractors
)
+
(
Uber
:
TaskRabbit
)
+ {Local Customers}
=
Alternative Work
Arrangement =
Intermediary
Platform
Gig Worker =
Alternative Work
Arrangement +
Intermediary
Platform +
Local
Customers
A different category of workers, which have not yet been
often contemplated with regards to the gig-economy because
they do not report as individual entities, is looming with sim-
ilar characteristics as alternative workers. The category I re-
fer to comprises non-employer firms. What the government
calls businesses whose owners are the only employees are
mostly run by one self-employed individual operating un-
incorporated businesses (known as proprietorships), which
may or may not be the owner’s principal source of income.27
23Cf. Gierten and Spiezia (2016).
24For a good review of non-standard and contingent work arrangements
see Bernhardt (2014), Jackson et al. (2017), Abraham et al. (2016) and
Gierten and Spiezia (2016).
25Cf. Abraham et al. (2016).
26Cf. Jackson et al. (2017).
27https://www.census.gov/epcd/non-employer/view/define.ht
ml
A non-employer business, as defined by the U.S. Census Bu-
reau, is one that has no paid employees, has annual business
receipts of $1,000 or more ($1 or more in the construction
industries), and is subject to federal income taxes.
There is certainly a grey area between non-employer
firms and gig-workers. However, both include alternative
work arrangements and the majority of non-employer firms
are self-employed individuals as are gig workers if not mis-
classified in tax reports. With this in mind it can be assumed
that there may be some correlation between the two classifi-
cations of workers and the gig-economy.
2.3. Measuring the Gig-Economy
Accurate measurement of the magnitude and the growth
of the gig-economy is important for understanding current la-
bor market trends. These trends have extensive implications
for the income, health insurance coverage, and retirement
security of self-employed workers.28 While self-employment
offers certain advantages, workers turning away from tradi-
tional work arrangements will no longer receive substantial
employee benefits, labor protections like overtime pay and
minimum wages, training and skills development, and tax
benefits that operate through the employee-employer rela-
tionship.29 Hence, understanding the implications of the im-
pact of the gig-economy on the changing workforce is an im-
portant step not only for workers wealth and benefit but also
for administrations towards improving labor and tax policies.
Existing surveys and administrative data are not well
suited to capture new forms of labor, and the new nature of
work arrangements makes it difficult to monitor.30 The data
on the activities of self-employed is collected infrequently
and is often incomplete. It is hard to clarify the sector and its
meaning due to the changing nature of work, worker’s rights
and the controversy about legal, social and fiscal aspects of
services provided via online platforms.31 The gig-economy
is fragmented as each individual works on a contract or free-
lance basis, and thus may use several services, have many
clients and work variable hours over time without clear affil-
iation to a company, a sector, a tax class or social security. It
also spans multiple industries. Self-employers not only en-
compass gig workers but also other forms of self-employed
workers. Another insecurity arises from the fact that individ-
uals reporting self-employment income in surveys also file a
tax return that report employee wages.32 In addition, some
28Administrations and public agencies rely on labor market information
such as employment-population ratio, multiple jobholding rate, labor mar-
ket dynamism, real wages and earnings distribution, and productive inputs
to improve recommendations on labor policies.
29These benefits include, though are not limited to, health insurance and
retirement coverage, tax compliance and administration, and protections
under labor, occupational safety, and discrimination laws.
30Cf. Fox (2014), Abraham et al. (2016); Codagnone et al. (2016).
31Cf. Codagnone et al. (2016).
32Abraham et al. (2016) show that a large share of individuals who report
being an employee in response to surveys also file a tax return that reports
self-employment earnings rather than wages.
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workers earn income from both wages and self-employment,
but do not report their self-employment status in surveys.33
As online platforms - the digital marketspace-providers
of the gig-economy - are private companies, they are not re-
quired to disclose employee numbers, or revenue. Public
institutions are not in a position to gather data. The Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS) used to release the Contingent
Work Supplement (CWS) to the Current Population Survey
(CPS), which provided periodically information on contin-
gent workers and other self-employed contractors including
gig employment.34 However, they ceased surveying contin-
gent workers after 2005, which means that no continuous
database exists on workers in the gig-economy.35 This has
resulted in a race among researchers to find the most accu-
rate measurement of the magnitude and growth of the gig-
economy to compensate the poorly or incomplete data pro-
vided by households survey and federal statistics. In 2015
Katz and Krueger updated in a similar survey to the RAND
American Life Panel (ALP) the data from the CPS CWS with
additional information on workers’ use of online platforms
in the quest for customers.36 This work became a prominent
data collecting survey specifically designed to measure alter-
native work arrangements relevant for the gig-economy.
Gig workers might also show up in federal statistics, in
household survey responses on self-employment activity and
in administrative data from tax reports to the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) and the Social Security Administration
(SSA) such as the 1040 Schedule C (sole proprietorship busi-
ness), the 1040 Schedule SE (self-employment), and the
1099 MISC (box 7 non-employee compensation).37 How-
ever, most of the past research using these sources strug-
gled to prove the adequacy of the data to measure the
gig-economy.38 Abraham et al. (2016) show discrepancy
between IRS and survey data and attempt to reconcile them.
Chen et al. (2017) estimate the value of flexible work from
Uber data. Mas and Pallais (2017) estimate the value of flex-
ible work from survey data. Jackson et al. (2017) uses IRS
data to show that all of the increase in self-employment is
due to sole proprietors who have little or no business-related
educations, and who therefor appear to almost exclusively
provide labor services.
As mentioned in the introduction just a few studies have
considered using non-employer firms for measuring the size
of the gig-economy. Hathaway and Muro (2016) show the
growth and geographical spread of non-employer firms in
33Cf. Abraham et al. (2016).
34See chapter 3.1.
35Secretary of Labor Tom Perez announced in January 2016 that the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS) will resume the survey on contingent work-
ers every two years starting in May 2017 including supplementary ques-
tions designed to capture technology-enabled gig work. See Donovan et al.
(2016)and https://blog.dol.gov/2016/01/25/innovation-and-the
-contingent-workforce.
36Katz and Krueger (2016a).
37Cf. Abraham et al. (2016).
38For the following see Cf. Abraham et al. (2016).; Chen et al. (2017);
Mas and Pallais (2017); Jackson et al. (2017).
the passanger ground transit and rooming industries.39 In
another paper published by The Future of Work Initiative,
Holtz-Eakin et al. (2017) used non-employer establishment
data to measure the overall growth of the gig-economy work-
force. However, the insecurities in measuring the exact size
of this labor pool have remained high and no evidence about
the adequacy has been provided. This metric is not per-
fect. One reason is that non-employer firms include any self-
employed person with no employees regardless of whether
they earned income driving for Uber or mowing their neigh-
bors’ lawns and thereby creating a risk of misclassification.
Furthermore the metric captures only those individuals who
declared that income to the IRS.
2.4. The Rise of Alternative Work in the Gig-Economy
As described in the previous section, the different ap-
proaches found in literature to measure the size of the gig-
economy are manifold. Some retrieve data on tax reports
and other administrative information, other use statistical
data captured by household surveys or company owned data,
and others carry out their own surveys. While most studies
provided estimations of the size of the gig-economy at one
point in time, just a few were able to measure the evolution
over time. Nevertheless, most of those who did estimate a
trend found a considerable rise in self-employment workers
or other alternative work arrangements.
The 2015 survey by Katz and Krueger (2016b) shows that
the share of workers involved in alternative work arrange-
ments increased from 10.7 % to 15.8 % from 2005 to 2015.40
A striking implication of this estimate is that all of the net
employment growth in the U.S. economy appears to have oc-
curred in alternative work arrangements. In particular, the
findings show that nearly 16 % of all workers are engaged in
alternate work arrangements and that those who provide ser-
vices through online intermediaries only account for 0.5 % of
the total workforce. Even though, it appears that the level of
individual workers using intermediary platforms to find cus-
tomers is quite infinitesimal when compared to traditional
contingent work, Katz and Krueger noted that the online in-
termediaries are growing at an impressive rate. They also dis-
covered that alternative work arrangements increased in size
in all of the four categories over the ten-year period between
2005 and 2015.41 Independent contractors, the largest sub-
category of alternative work arrangements, grew from 6.9 %
to 8.4 %. The percentage of on-call workers increased from
1.7 % to 2.6 %. Workers in temporary-help agencies com-
prised 1.6 %, up from 0.9 % in 2005. Finally, workers at
contract firms accounted for 3.3 %, an increase from a 0.6 %
share.
Another study conducted in late 2015 by JP Morgan
Chase Institute show that the number of individuals using
39Cf. Hathaway and Muro (2016).
40For the following see Katz and Krueger (2016a).
41For a more detailed insights into the evolution of alternative work ar-
rangements prior to 2005 see Bureau of Labor Statistics (2005).
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online labor-platforms has increase 54-fold since 2012 reach-
ing a 0.4 % of the U.S. workforce (which is in line with Katz
and Krueger’s 0.5 % of the total workforce).42 Interestingly,
these individuals derive one third of their income from on-
line platforms, and even more so when their non-platform
income drops. Furthermore, the analysis estimated that 1 %
actively earn income from some type of online platform in a
given month and that 4 % had participated in one of these
platforms over a three-year period. The findings also show
that although labor platforms are growing more rapidly than
capital platforms, the capital platform market is still signifi-
cantly larger.
More recently, Abraham et al. (2016) has shown that es-
timates of self-employment from households survey and ad-
ministrative data differ in both level and trend.43 Data col-
lected from tax reports by the IRS on self-employment are
ranging between 12 % and 17 % with an upwards trend
compared to a range of 6 % to 8 % and a downward trend
with information gathered through household survey such
as the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the American
Community Survey (ACS). This discrepancy shows the im-
portance for a more specific and adequate measure to under-
stand changing work activities in the gig-economy.
Using non-employer statistics, Hathaway and Muro
(2016) discover that over the past 20 years, the number
of gig-economy workers measured with non-employer firms
has increased by about 27 % more than payroll employees.
The change is even more severe in certain industries, like
ground transportation, where the number of gig-economy
workers increased 44 % more than payroll employees. Hath-
away and Muro (2016) found evidence of a change in the
numbers, and the potential for a realignment of the role of
non-employer firms in the gig-economy.
3. Data and Frameworks: Building Datasets and Frame-
works with Non-Employer Statistics
The main analytical goal of the study is to assess the role
of non-employer firms in the gig-economy by the mean of
quantitative methods. This shall help to better understand
the gig-economy’s impact on labor markets and measure la-
bor dynamics and other economic issues to change in the ex-
posure to online labor-platforms. As a paradigmatic exam-
ple of an online-platform, I chose the case of Uber’s expan-
sion in the U.S., which presents a quasi-natural treatment for
single labor markets. To carry out this research, a compre-
hensive dataset is needed with historical data on gig-workers
on the one hand and on the staggered entry of Uber on the
other. This section details the construction of the longitu-
dinal datasets and the econometric frameworks used in the
statistical analyses of my thesis.
42Cf. Farrell and Greig (2016).
43Cf. Abraham et al. (2016).
3.1. Data Sources and Construction of Datasets
Existing surveys and administrative data are not well
suited to capture new forms of labor, and hence cannot
be used to provide quantitative response.44 The Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) offered the Contingent Work Supple-
ment (CWS) to the Current Population Survey (CPS), which
provided information on independent workers and other
self-employed contractors including gig employment in the
year 2005. This data was updated in 2015 by Katz and
Krueger in a similar survey to the RAND American Life Panel
(ALP). Drawing on raw data from multiple sources, I utilized
data described in these subchapters in order to estimate and
understand the influence of online intermediary-platforms
on labor markets. My investigations rely on three types of
data sources. First and foremost, administrative data which
is extracted from tax reports or other declarations and made
available by federal institutions such as the U.S. Census
Bureau. Administrative data provides information that can
help address certain shortcomings of survey-based measures,
which appear to underestimate self-employment activity.45
The second type of data source is survey data collected by
government agencies such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). And the third source stems from corporate statistics,
in this case provided by Uber Technologies Inc in a statistical
report. A detailed overview of all data sources can be found
in appendix Table 2.
None of the raw data sets described above are in a form
amenable to statistical analysis, which makes necessary purg-
ing, formatting, and recoding of the data before new vari-
ables can be defined. The raw data on non-employer firms,
employer firms and alternative work arrangements, for in-
stance, is not formatted in a one-to-one table. Indeed, some
observations are tabled in form of aggregated data such as
the number of established non-employer firms which are ar-
ranged on a county level, a state level and a national level
in the same column. Furthermore, to be able to merge data
from administrative sources and from surveys, I adapted the
variables and their associated values to match within all data
sets.
Unlike survey data, using administrative data, which does
not ask specifically whether respondents are employees or
contractors, is particularly challenging as information on in-
dividuals is limited and not as targeted. Federal institutions
such as the Census Bureau doesn’t publish these numbers in
very user-friendly form, but I was able to get the raw data,
utilizing the numbers in a beneficial manner from some other
government surveys, and deliver a remarkably detailed pic-
ture of what activities the unincorporated self-employed are
involved in.
3.1.1. Non-Employer Statistics
The starting point for my data construction and the key
element in my primary analyses is the non-employer statis-
tics which originates from statistical information obtained
44Cf. Fox (2014); Jackson et al. (2017).
45Katz and Krueger (2016a); Abraham et al. (2016).
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through business income tax records that the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) provides to the U.S. Census Bureau.46 A
non-employer firm is what the government refers to busi-
nesses whose owners are the only employees. Most are run
by one self-employed individual but non-employer firms also
comprise independent contractors, on-call workers, tempo-
rary help agency workers and workers provided by contract
firms.
The non-employer statistics provides the only annual
source of comprehensive data on the scope, nature, and ac-
tivities of U.S. businesses with no paid employees at detailed
industrial (NAICS codes) and geographical level (counties),
which is the relevant level for labor markets.47 The data is
captured from 1999-2014 and is made available on the U:S.
Census website.48 It is worth mentioning that the compara-
bility of the data over time may be affected by changes in
industry classifications, methodology, and geographic defi-
nitions. However this issue in most part, especially given
the scope of my work, is not relevant for the purposes of my
research and, thus, was not addressed in the analysis.
The goal of extracting information from this source is to
obtain a data set of non-employer firms by state and industry
sector in the U.S. from 2005 to 2014 and use it to demon-
strate the relevance of non-employer firms as a proxy for
alternative work arrangements or independent work during
this time span with constrained data availability.
The raw data set encompassing the number of non-
employer firms was appended for the years between 1999
and 2014 and recoded in order to obtain a data set with
the following variables: number of non-employer firms by
state, industry, and year. I then created a state- and industry-
specific identifier (state*industry) i.e. the Cartesian product
of the variable state and industry, which a is an indicator vari-
able grouping state and sector and specifying each industry
sector in each state with a single and defined indicator. This
indicator variable is crucial to observe and run the analyses
at within single industry sectors in each state.
The different industries are characterized with the 4-digit
code from North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) and are fully included in the data set. This leaves
the freedom of trimming it into a 2-digit code to cluster
broader industry sectors or to subtract specific industries
such as the taxi and limousine industry when creating new
variables and considering Uber-driver specific labor markets.
Duplicate industries in manufacturing, and transportation
and warehousing looming in the data set were merged to-
gether to avoid double counting.
The resulting dataset consists of 5 variables comprising
the number and total sales of non-employer firms between
1999 and 2004 and 3264 observations49 corresponding to
46When the Census Bureau receives information through administrative
records that a business has no paid employees, then the business becomes
part of the potential non-employer universe.
47Non-employer statistics use 2012 NAICS code.
48Census (2016).
49From an initial raw data set of 1,737,135 observations. However cau-
each consolidated industry in each U.S. state. The informa-
tion on non-employer establishments is the main subject of
my analyses and is crucial for three steps of my research.
First and foremost, it will help demonstrate its relevance as
a proxy for independent workers and alternative work ar-
rangements which represent the major piece of labor supply
in the gig-economy. Secondly, this relevance will be under-
scored by using non-employer firms to show the impact of
Uber’s market entry, as an example for an intermediary gig-
platform, on single metropolitan labor markets. And lastly, it
will serve as a proxy for further investigations on the role of
unemployment in the gig-economy and other labor economic
questions.
The use of non-employer firms is a helpful proxy for self-
employment and alternative work arrangements; however,
as most administrative data this information is less useful for
identifying the nature of work or the types of activities that
people take on in self-employment.50
3.1.2. Current Population Survey - Contingent Workers Sup-
plement 2005
Another key source of data relevant for analyzing changes
in the labor market due to exposure to online-platforms is
the Contingent Workers Supplement (CWS). This is a supple-
ment to the Current Population Survey (CPS) which in turn
is a household survey conducted periodically by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics.(BLS).51
The CWS collects data on contingent and alternative em-
ployment arrangements and provides information on the
type of employment arrangement workers have on their
current job and other characteristics of the current job. Con-
tingent workers are persons who do not expect their jobs
to last or who reported that their jobs are temporary. They
do not have an implicit or explicit contract for ongoing em-
ployment. Alternative employment arrangements include
persons self-employed as independent contractors, on-call
workers, temporary help agency workers, and workers pro-
vided by contract firms. The raw data can be downloaded
from the BLS website.52
The BLS gets its self-employment aggregate data from a
monthly survey of 60,000 American households conducted
by the U.S. Census Bureau (which is the same survey that
generates the unemployment rate). Respondents are asked,
whether they were employed by government, by a private
company, a nonprofit organization, or whether they were
tion should be exercised as the observations do not correspond to the num-
ber of non-employer firms but rather to the number of industries appended
throughout all U.S. counties in which non-employer firms are counted.
50Specifically, the wide range of self-employed activities includes consul-
tants, real estate agents, construction workers, housekeeping services.
51The Current Population Survey is a monthly survey of about 60.000
households conducted by the for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.(BLS) and
the primary source of labor force statistics for the population of the United
States. It provides a comprehensive body of data on the labor force, em-
ployment, unemployment, persons not in the labor force, hours of work,
earnings, and other demographic and labor force characteristics.
52https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/current-population-sur
vey-contingent-worker-supplement.
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self-employed in the previous week.53 In addition to contin-
gent workers, the survey also identified those workers who
have alternative work arrangements. An employment ar-
rangement may be defined as both contingent and alterna-
tive, but this is not automatically the case because contin-
gency is defined separately from the four alternative work
arrangements (1) independent contractors, (2) on-call work-
ers, (3) temporary help agency workers, (4) workers pro-
vided by contract firms.
The CWS is a relevant source of data in consideration of
the changing nature of work and especially the gig-economy.
Unfortunately the BLS has stopped collecting information on
contingent and alternative work relationships in February
2005. In the absence of more recent data and in view of
the rise of new labor economies the BLS has announced to
resume the survey in 2017. Estimating the link between the
change in non-employer firms and the rise of alternative work
arrangements requires a longitudinal dataset with compara-
ble historical information. This data from the 2005 survey
on alternative work arrangements with 63,600 observations,
however is cross-sectional and therefore provides only infor-
mation at one point in time. This is why I built a dataset link-
ing both CPS CWS data with the RPCWS from 2015 described
in the next subsection. In order, to obtain matching informa-
tion with the other sources, I recoded the industry nomencla-
ture from Census code to NAICS code and consolidated the
latter at a 2-digit level. I then merged duplicate industries
occurring in the raw data to avoid divided and distorted re-
sults. In order to separately investigate the different subcat-
egories of alternative work arrangements, I created separate
variables from the respondents’ responses on the number of
self-employed contractor, on-call workers, contractors, and
temporary workers filed by state and industry. These were
consolidate into a variable yielding alternative work arrange-
ments, which consists of all of the above.
To obtain more meaningful results, I created separate ra-
tios for each single work arrangement mentioned above as a
percentage to the total of observations by industry and state.
The resulting dataset consists of eight variables reflecting ra-
tios of work arrangements and 240 observations for each con-
solidated industry and in each U.S. state.
3.1.3. Rand-Princeton Contingent Worker Survey (Katz and
Krueger 2015)
To fill the void created by the absence of recent data on
contingent and alternative workers, Katz and Krueger have
conducted the RAND-Princeton Contingent Worker Survey
(RPCWS) in October and November 2015.54 The RPCWS is a
version of the BLS’s CWS with additional inquiries to gather
more information on work arrangements including questions
on whether individuals worked through an intermediary such
as Uber, Avon or TaskRabbit and whether they sold goods or
53Cf. Fox (2014).
54Cf. Katz and Krueger (2016a).
services.55 The sample was collected randomly using a com-
pilation of methods and has been aligned to the CPS through
a set of survey weights.56 The survey weights account for
the fact that self-employed workers were over-represented
in the RPCWS compared to the CPS CWS. I made use of this
weighted dataset which has been made available for federal
institutions and accredited researchers on the ALP website
since November 2016.57
This survey being a sequel of the CPS CWS, makes it an
essential source of data for further research on alternative
work arrangements. It provides a second set of data points
in the year 2015 which will allow the observation of change
in time and a comparison with the change of non-employer
firms in the 10 years period between 2005 and 2015. This
cross sectional data collected through random sampling in
a national survey consists of 2,760 observations of individ-
ual workers restricted to those who did any work during the
week prior to the survey.
To turn this raw data into valuable and ordered informa-
tion, I proceeded analogous to the construction of the CPS
CWS dataset, i.e. transforming survey data on individual
workers into ratios of the different subcategories of work
arrangements to total observations by industry and state ob-
taining 141 observations and 8 variables. Having a set of
variables reflecting the same information (the ratios of work
arrangements to total employed by industry and state ) in
2015 as ten years earlier with the CPS CWS data, I merged
both datasets adding up the number of observations to 315.
I then, generated the indicator variable “state*industry”,
grouping state and sector into a single state- and industry
identifier, as executed with the non-employer firms data. As
a next step, I computed the change in share of alternative
workers between 2005 and 2015 by state*industry for each
subcategory respectively. With this, I have an identical ob-
servation variable and longitudinal data in both the dataset
on non-employer firms and the one on alternative workers
allowing me to make comparisons in change over time and
across industries and states. If I can provide the evidence
that the increase in non-employer firms between 2005 and
2015 is strongest in states and industries where it is strongest
in alternative work arrangements, I will be able to show that
non-employer firms are a good proxy for alternative workers
and validate my assumption.
3.1.4. County Business Patterns
Using proportions in science, economics, and business as
well as in other disciplines makes results more meaningful
55A copy of the questionnaire is available online and can be down-
loaded from https://alpdata.rand.org/index.php?page=data&p=s
howsurvey&syid=441
56The RPCWS sample is described here: https://alpdata.rand.o
rg/index.php?page=panelcomposition and weighting procedures are
described at: https://alpdata.rand.org/index.php?page=weights.
See Katz and Krueger (2016a) for more details on the robustness of the
survey.
57https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2015/econ/cbp
/2015-cbp.html
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as they offer more information than simple numbers and put
the given information into perspective. In order to interpret
results in a relative context but also to weight disproportional
data and align it with previous work, it is essential to include
further information on employer firms.
The County Business Patterns (CBP) is an annual series
that provides subnational economic data by industry includ-
ing the number of establishments with paid employees. The
data items are extracted from the Business Register (BR), a
database of all known single and multi-establishment em-
ployer companies maintained and updated by the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau. CBP covers more than 6 million single-unit es-
tablishments and 1.8 million multi-unit establishments.
Employer firms provided with the CBP needs to be in-
cluded to balance out disproportions in non-employer firms
and alternative work arrangements and to adjust the change
for other trends in the labor market. It also allows to carry out
regressions with ratios and relative numbers of employment
characteristics and provide comparable results. In terms of
dataset construction, I firstly appended the raw data encom-
passing the number of non-employer firms for each year be-
tween 1999 and 2014 and kept industry information on a
2-digit NAICS code level to maintain an adequate degree of
clarity. Some industry values appearing twice were merged
to avoid duplicates; NAICS code 31, 32, and 33 were merged
as "manufacturing", 44 and 45 merged to "retail trade", and
48 and 49 to "Transportation and Warehousing". To focus
on the relevant sectors for the gig-economy and put aside in-
dustries such as agriculture, mining, utilities, and construc-
tion which are not relevant or not element of the contingent
workers survey, I also consolidated the industries "manufac-
turing = 1", "retail and wholesale trade = 2" and "Services58
= 3". As a result, I obtain a dataset of all U.S. establishments
with paid employees by state, industry and year which en-
ables me to generate new variables and apply weights on the
regression estimates.
3.1.5. Uber Statistics Report
As a key part of my analysis, I use the case of Uber’s ex-
pansion in the U.S. to test if and to what extent non-employer
firms are relevant in the gig-economy and to estimate the
impact of online platforms on labor markets. Founded in
2009, Uber is a mobile smartphone application that allows
consumers to submit a trip request, which is then routed to
Uber drivers who use their own cars to fulfill the request.
In this work I refer to UberX, which is Uber’s low-cost ride-
hailing option and the first service offered when expanding
into new areas. Estimating the link between the exposure of
58The pool "services" comprises all of the following trades which are iden-
tified with a specific NAICS code "Transportation and Warehousing", "In-
formation", "Finance and Insurance", "Real Estate and Rental and Leasing",
"Professional Scientific, and Technical Services", "Management of Compa-
nies and Enterprises", "Admin, Support, Waste Management, and Remedia-
tion Services", "Educational Services", "Health Care and Social Assistance",
"Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation", "Accommodation and Food Services",
"Other Services and Public Administration".
non-employer firms to online-platforms, requires a longitudi-
nal dataset with information on the time and place of Uber’s
market entry. Data on Uber’s expansion by city are retrieved
directly from a statistics report made public in 2016.59 The
data collected from the corporate owned website uber.com
shows the launching of Uber’s activity by city over the years
since the first launch of their service UberX in San Francisco
in 2010. The staggered entry of UberX in different Metropoli-
tan Statistical Areas (MSA’s) in the U.S. offers a quasi-natural
experiment to instrument for local labor market’s exposure
to online platform, and study their impact not only on em-
ployment across sectors as in this work but other economic
patterns.
Uber’s data is not entirely precise, i.e. it is not clear what
counties or geographical areas are included in the designated
cities. Non-employer firms are not necessarily located in the
city where they operate, i.e. an Uber driver can provide his
or her service in the designated city but live in the nearby
county.
In order to investigate the overall impact of Uber’s entry
and rule out the difference in years it is necessary to singu-
larize the time of market entry into a unified scale variable.
For the purpose of unifying Uber’s market entry across the
country, I converted the data relative to the year of launch in
each respective city. This converted scale characterizes the
year of entry with "year 0", the years prior to entry with the
respective difference i.e. "year -1", "year -2", and the years
following Uber’s market entry with "year 1", "year 2".
The variables post and pre are dichotomous treatment
variables indicating each relative year of Uber’s entry in a
given county. Consistent with prior studies examining the
effect of Uber’s entry on a local area, I focus on UberX, as
opposed to other service, due to the significantly larger net-
work of drivers.60 As a next step, I generated a binary vari-
able specifying whether Uber was present in a city (valued
as "1") or not (valued as "0") to distinguish market places
with Uber treatment from those without. I then associated
the city with the county codes of the according metropoli-
tan area which reflects adequately the commuting zone level
of labor markets. This poses challenges in two cities, where
the metropolitan area is not congruent with the county area
from the administrative datasets.61 The revised dataset con-
taining Uber’s year of entry by metropolitan area with the
according counties was merged with non-employer firms and
employer firms (CBP) data. For the purpose of matching em-
ployer firms and non-employer firms operating within the
same industry as Uber-drivers, I created a respective variable
subtracting all firms that are not assigned to the industry of
"Taxi and Limousine Service" classified with the NAICS code
59Cf. Uber (2016); Burtch et al. (2016).
60Cf. Burtch et al. (2016); Greenwood and Wattal (2017).
61While some cities illustrated in the data are distinctively distinguishable,
others like Twin Cities and Rockies are not. Twin Cities is referring to the
metropolitan area built around the cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul. The
designation “Rockies, CO” couldn’t be associated to any county and was left
out of the data.
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"4853" and "Other Transit and Ground Passenger Transporta-
tion" classified with the NAICS code "4859". These two in-
dustry descriptions are assumed to be the most relevant for
ride-hailing work enabled by Uber. Once having created this
set of variables with firms and independent workers within
the latter industries I refer to as the taxi or the Uber indus-
try, I generated three new ratio variables; the first being the
share of taxi-non-employer firms to all taxi employees, the
second variable describes the taxi-non-employer firms as a
share of all employees, and the last one indicates the share
of non-employer firms to all firms. Similarly to the above
mentioned unification of the differences in years, created a
lagged variable of each of these ratios and a lagged logarith-
mic variable for the number of all employees which is sup-
posed to respond to large difference in values in comparison
to the other variables. For additional investigations, I created
a pre entry and post entry variable aggregating all values be-
fore and after Uber’s treatment of the economy. The dataset
now consists of variables with values for the 3 years prior to
Uber’s market entry and the 4 years post market entry.
The final analysis dataset for the investigation on Uber’s
impact on non-employer firms contains 42.095 observations
for each point in time between the years 2002 and 2014 and
throughout states and counties with 14 variables on the num-
ber of employer and non-employer firms inside the taxi and
ground passenger industry respectively. With this, I can carry
out the analysis on the role of non-employer firms in the gig-
economy and the impact of gig platforms on labor markets.
3.1.6. Local Area Unemployment Statistics
An important concern that stems from the rise of the gig-
economy is whether online platforms have had a positive im-
pact on unemployment. In order to investigate that question,
I utilize unemployment data from federal statistics. The Lo-
cal Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program provides
annual average estimates of labor force, employment, un-
employment, and the unemployment rate for about 7,500
subnational areas. The concepts and definitions used by the
LAUS program are the same as those used in the Current Pop-
ulation Survey (CPS). The areas include Census regions such
as states, metropolitan areas, combined areas, small labor
market areas, and counties.62
These estimates are key indicators of local economic con-
ditions and are used by various federal programs to help de-
termine the distribution of funds to be allocated to each eli-
gible area. In the context of my work, I will use the data to
investigate the change in unemployment associated with the
rise of non-employer firms to understand the impact of on-
line gig-platforms on labor force. The raw data is composed
of three main variables: the number of employed individu-
als, unemployed individuals and the labor force by FIPS code
and year. Based on these variables, I computed the unem-
ployment rate. Unfortunately, the data doesn’t contain infor-
62LAUS data can be downloaded online: https://www.bls.gov/lau/
data.htm.
mation on unemployment across different industries which
limits the possibilities of investigations.
3.2. Analysis Data, Specifications and Variable Definitions
The outcome of the data construction described in the
previous chapter is a set of six separate panel data that can
be merged into several constellations depending on the in-
tended research application.63 Based on these constructed
sets, I created four new analysis datasets, each of them with
a precise sequential purpose within my research approach.
A summary of the final analysis datasets and their contain-
ing variables, which are created with data management tech-
niques, is tabled in appendix Table 3.
The first set of panel data contains information on non-
employer firms, alternative work arrangements from CPS
CWS and RPCWS, and on employer firms sorted by state,
industry, and years for 2005 and 2015. It aims at test-
ing my first hypotheses - that non-employer firms increase
more in states and industries where the increase is highest
in alternative work - by estimating the correlation between
non-employer firms and alternative work arrangements, and
thereby filling the void of data shortage on self-employed
and alternative workers between 2005 and 2015.
The second set of panel data comprises the staggered
entry of Uber and the number of non-employer firms and
employer firms sorted by county, industry, and year for the
period between 2006 and 2014. This time frame not only
allows investigating the effect of Uber in the years after
its market entry in 2010 but also the prevailing conditions
in the labor market 4 years prior to its launch. Showing
the association between the rise of non-employer firms and
Uber’s expansion will help test my second hypothesis that
non-employer firms are a relevant proxy for alternative work
in the gig-economy and help estimate the magnitude of the
gig-economy’s impact on labor markets.
The objective of the third set of panel data is to un-
derstand the growth decomposition of non-employer firms,
which can explain the dependence of the rise in non-
employer firms on industry and labor supply dynamics. It is
formed by merging non-employer firms and employer firms
around a cluster of 23 industries sorted by state and years.
With this dataset I aim to show that the gig-economy is can-
nibalizing jobs within same industries and within same states
causing little to no spillover.
My last analysis dataset consists of a set of variables on
unemployment, employer and non-employer firms, as well as
time variables on Uber’s local market entry sorted by county
and year. The main purpose of this longitudinal dataset is to
test my assumption that the rise of non-employer firms and
thereby the gig-economy is contributing to a decline in un-
employment and not taking away jobs from employer firms.
63Panel data (also known as longitudinal or cross-sectional time-series
data) is a dataset in which the behavior of entities are observed across time.
Panel data allows to control for variables you cannot observe or measure like
variables that change over time but not across entities. This is, it accounts
for individual heterogeneity.
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It also aims to assess the impact of the gig-economy on un-
employment or vice-versa.
In all of the above datasets, I generated different types of
variables such as observation variables, indicator variables,
control variables, and dummy variables that are essential
in the estimations described hereafter. For the purpose of
putting non-employer firms in perspective to the entirety
of employees, I created the variable non-employer share
(NonempShare) which is defined as the ratio of the total
number of non-employer firms to the total employment (sum
of non-employer firms and employees) by each state and in-
dustry in a given year (in short: non-employer firms as a
percent of all employees).
NonempShare =
Nonempfirms
Nonempfirms+ Employees
Considering this ratio enables the observation variable to
be adjusted to externalities and global fluctuations in the la-
bor market and makes non-employer share the key variable
of my analysis.
I then created the variable state*industry i.e. the Carte-
sian product of the variable state and industry, which is an
indicator variable grouping state and sector and specifying
each industry sector in each state with a single and defined
indicator. This indicator variable is crucial to observe and run
the analyses within single industry sectors in each state. The
share of alternative work arrangements computed with CPS
and RPCWS data determines the ratio of alternative work ar-
rangements to total employers. The share of non-employer
firms is now computed as the number of establishments with
no employees to the sum of non-employer firms and em-
ployer firms from the CBP data by state*industry from the
Census data. The change of both ratios can now be deter-
mined by means of a lagged variable. The difference in the
10-year lagged variable and the corresponding ratio provides
the change in share of non-employer firms.
In order to itemize my analysis, I also created different
variants and different subcategories of non-employer share
such as the share in alternative work arrangements, in self-
employed contractors, in on-call workers, and in temporary
agency workers. The breakdown of alternative work arrange-
ments into its different subgroups for a separate estimation
aims to answer the question which subgroup has the greater
effect on the dependent variable.
The variables have been standardized so that the vari-
ances of dependent and independent variables are equal to 1.
Therefore, standardized coefficients refer to how many stan-
dard deviations a dependent variable will change, per stan-
dard deviation increase in the predictor variable. For univari-
ate regression, the absolute value of the standardized coeffi-
cient equals the correlation coefficient. Standardization of
the coefficient is usually done to answer the question which
of the independent variables has a greater effect on the de-
pendent variable.64
64Cf. Allen (1997).
3.3. Econometric Frameworks
Each step of the analysis uses state-of-the-art econometric
frameworks to test the hypotheses on the relevance of non-
employer statistics for independent work in the gig-economy.
My focus in the first step is on showing the correlation be-
tween non-employer statistics and alternative work arrange-
ments (and self-employed contractors) which should indi-
cate the suitability of the number of non-employer firms as
a proxy for the extent of independent work. The second
part of the analysis aims to underscore that hypothesis and,
with a natural experiment, measure the magnitude of im-
pact of Uber’s staggered market entry in U.S. metropolitan
statistical areas (MSA) on non-employer firms. In a third
step, I decompose the change in non-employer firm preva-
lence between and within state and industry sector to esti-
mate the impact the rise of independent workers on labor dy-
namics. Furthermore, to identify whether the rise of the gig-
economy is driven by the availability of unemployed work-
ers and thus new job allocation, I measure the correlation of
unemployment dynamics and non-employer firm prevalence.
This analysis addresses the proposition that by lowering bar-
riers to entry in certain sectors, platforms allow people to
work when they would otherwise be unemployed, thereby
enabling them to smooth income.
3.3.1. Correlation between growth in non-employer firm
prevalence and growth in alternative work
Starting with the first set of regressions I aim to measure
the correlation between the change in non-employer firm
prevalence and the change in alternative work arrangements
captured by Katz and Krueger in the 2015 Rand-Princeton
Contingent Work Survey (RPCWS) compared to the 2005
CPS. While many approaches in the research literature are
applied to address the problem of the shortage of informa-
tion on gig workers, just a few have considered using the
number of non-employer firms to illustrate the labor effects
of this new economy. The prior analyses cannot leverage the
relevance of this data for filling the information gap between
2005 and 2015. Thus, the first part of my analysis is to show
the relevance of non-employer firms as a proxy for indepen-
dent workers.
Here, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The
first set of regressions employ a panel dataset suitable for
multivariate modeling (with and without fixed effects). The
variables in question are by their standard deviation by year
to equalize the range of data variability.65 This is important
for multivariate analysis and makes it easier to read and com-
pare results from the regression ensuring that all variables
are on the same scale.66
In the first model, the dependent variable is the ratio of
non-employer firms to total employees, referred as to non-
employer share (cf. chapter 3.2). I introduce a weight on the
65The standardization applies to the share and the difference in the fol-
lowing three variables: alternative workers, non-employer firms, and self-
employed contractors.
66Cf. Stock and Watson (2006).
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total number of employees to balance for the disproportion-
ate representation of the survey data and to be consistent
with the prior research literature. This analytical weight is
also applied to make statistics computed from the data more
representative of the population since the datasets are built
on administrative and survey data and to take into account
that the outcome is an aggregated share. To check the robust-
ness of the results I ran all the following regressions both with
and without the weights.67
The dependent variable is likely to be related to both cur-
rent and lagged values of the independent variable that might
change over time. Thus, using fixed-effects (FE) models on
my panel data is appropriate in this setting because it is nec-
essary to control for all time-invariant differences, so the es-
timated coefficients of the models cannot be biased because
of omitted variables.68 However, to stay prudent I ran the
regressions with and without the fixed effects to verify the
magnitude of the effect. Fixed effects are employed to take
out heterogeneity among the states and to detrend all vari-
ables in time.
The econometric framework assuming correlation be-
tween non-employer share and labor force share engaged
in alternative work by Katz and Krueger and CPS data is
regression estimated as follows:
(NonempShare)s, j,t = β
∗
0 +β
∗
1 Xs, j,t +αs, j +γt +εs, j,t (1)
where (NonempShare) j,t is the standardized depen-
dent variable observed in time t (2005 or 2015) at the
state*industry level j which in the model groups the variable
industry and state into the single dimension state*industry.69
This framework is applied to a set of individual regressions
that are executed with a variation of fixed effects and weights
and with two different variables separately. In one set of re-
gressions the independent variable X j,t is defined as the
share of alternative work arrangements (Al tWorkShare) j,t
and in the second set as the share of self-employed contrac-
tors (Sel f EmpShare) j,t . α j are unobserved individual fixed
effects70 that help remove the bias caused by omitted time-
invariant variables such as state and state*industry which
are applied separately. γt represents time-period (yearly)
fixed effects which is included in all regressions. β∗0 is the in-
tersect, β∗1 the standardized regression coefficient, and ε j,t is
the standard error, which in this case equals the standard de-
viation of the sampling distribution of the coefficient.71 The
67Weights on the number of employees are only included in the model
whenever fixed effects of state*industry are applied.
68When using FE, I assume that something within the industry or
state*industry may impact or bias the outcome variables and it is necessary
to control for this. FE remove the effect of those time-invariant characteris-
tics so I can assess the net effect of the independent on the outcome variable.
69The state*industry variable is a Cartesian product of the variable state
and industry which serves as an identification variable giving each industry
in each state an specific value.
70Characteristics of state and industry that do not change over time.
71In order to avoid confusion, the standardized regression coefficients are
denoted with an asterisk in order to distinguish them from unstandardized
coefficients.
model uses robust standard errors, also known as White er-
rors, to correct for biases introduced by heteroskedasticity.72
For the model-based interpretation, we must assume that X j,t
and ε j,t are uncorrelated (E[X j,t |ε j,t] = 0) As the indepen-
dent variable in the above regression equation, I employ, first,
the labor force share of alternative workers and, second, the
share of self-employed contractors. Self-employed contrac-
tors are a large subset of alternative workers. The described
framework is a regression that by analogy estimates for the
same dependent variable the individual effect of both the
share in alternative workers and the share in self-employed
contractors as a major subset of alternative workers. The lat-
ter measures the effect of the share of workers who claim to
be self-employed in the CPS and Katz-Krueger surveys on the
prevalence of non-employer firms in a state*industry. This
multivariate framework allows variations in the regression
models on weights and fixed effects in order to check the
robustness of the analysis.
The last set of regressions aim to show that non-employer
firms can be used as a proxy for the extent of independent
work. They estimate the relationship between the change in
non-employer share from 2005 to 2015 and the change in the
number of alternative workers, as well as the change in the
number of self-employed contractors in that same time pe-
riod. This framework addresses my first hypothesis, that the
number of non-employer firms increases more in states and
sectors where the increase is largest in the 2015 Katz and
Krueger data compared to the outcome data from the 2005
Contingent Work Supplement. The corresponding linear re-
gression with fixed effects is modelled as follows:
(∆NonempShare)s,t = β
∗
0 + β
∗
1 Xs,t +αs + γt + εs,t (2)
where the independent variable (∆NonempShare)s,t
is the difference in non-employment share between 2005
and 2015, the dependent variable Xs,t is, in one case,
the difference in alternative workers from 2005 to 2015
(∆Al tWorkShare)s,t and, in the other case, the difference
in self-employed contractors (∆SelpEmpShare)s,t in that
same timeframe. Both sets of regressions are estimated with
and without a fixed effect αs for state s and with a time fixed
effect γt .
A subset of additional analyses have been carried out on
other categories of alternative work arrangements such as
on-call workers, temporary agency workers, and contractors.
The underlying frameworks are not further specified since
these categories of workers are not relevant for the scope of
my work.
72The traditional approach would be to test for the presence of het-
eroscedasticity using, for example, White’s test. If heteroscedasticity is found
then one would report robust SE, usually White SE which has become com-
mon practice in economics. Robust SE are typically larger than non-robust
standard errors, so the practice can be viewed as an effort to be conserva-
tive. See http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/jason.snyder/t
he-intuition-of-robust and Dougherty (2011).
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3.3.2. Pre and post effects of Uber’s market entry on non-
employer share
Aiming to understand the effects that online intermediary
platforms have on independent work and test the relevance
of non-employer firms for measuring the gig-economy’s im-
pact on labor markets, I developed a set of econometric
frameworks that uses the example of Uber’s staggered mar-
ket entry in the U.S. These frameworks address the underly-
ing hypothesis that non-employer firm prevalence increases
more in counties where Uber comes in.
The primary econometric specification I employ is a
multi-site entry differences-in-differences (DID) relative time
model. Intuitively, this regression model allows to conduct
a quasi-natural experiment using secondary data since the
treatment, i.e. the entry of Uber X, is applied in different
locations at different times, in plausibly exogenous manner.
The strategy behind the DID method amounts to comparing
the change in non-employer firms before and after the entry
of Uber in counties where Uber is providing services and
other counties where not.73
The longitudinal nature of the data allows me to examine
the existence of pre-treatment trends in non-employer firms
activity. This data structure further enables to include loca-
tion (county) and time (relative years) fixed effects, which
effectively control for static heterogeneity across counties, as
well as any unobserved temporal trends (e.g. seasonality)
or shocks (e.g. change in regulations). Acknowledging that
correlations between independent variables and residuals ex-
ists, I clustered counties making the estimate of the standard
error more conservative. I employ a relative time model, as
opposed to a traditional DID estimation, because it enables to
evaluate the parallel trends assumption. The key assumption
of the DID estimation is that there is no pre-treatment het-
erogeneity in the trends of treated and untreated groups. If
trends in the dependent variable differ across the two groups,
this presents a problem, as it implies that the untreated group
cannot serve as a valid control, i.e. reflection of what would
have happened in the absence of treatment. Extensively used
in literature, this estimation incorporates a second set of
time dummies that indicate the chronological distance be-
tween an observation period t, and a timing of treatment in
county c.74 Thus, this approach not only allows to ensure that
there is no pretreatment heterogeneity (in trends) between
the treated and untreated counties, it also helps determine
how long it takes for significant effects to manifest following
treatment. The econometric framework measuring the effect
of Uber’s market entry on non-employer firms is a DID re-
gression estimated as stated below which was run both with
73Cf. Waldiger (2015); Card and Krueger (1994).
74Cf. Autor (2003); Bapna et al. (2015); Chan and Ghose (2014); Green-
wood and Wattal (2017); Burtch et al. (2016)
post-treatment control variables and without
Yc,t = β0 + β1(Post)c,t + β2(Post ∗ 2010NonEmpShare)c,t
+ β3(Post ∗ EmpGrowth0610)c,t
+ β4(Post ∗ NonEmpGrowth0610)c,t
+αc + γt + εc,t
(3)
where the dependent variable Yc,t is the share of taxi
non-employer firms in all taxi employees in county c and
time t; (Post)c,t is a post-treatment dummy which is equal
to “1” if the observation is in a county where Uber is ac-
tive and “0” if not; and where the post treatment control
variables 2010NonEmpShare are the share of non-employer
firms in 2010; EmpGrowth0610 the logarithm of the employ-
ment growth from 2006 to 2010; and NonEmpGrowth0610
the logarithm of the non-employer firm growth from 2006
to 2010. These treatment dummy variables have the benefi-
cial effect of controlling for the change in employment that
is unrelated to Uber’s entry in the economic model. αc is the
county fixed effect, γt is the time fixed effect, εc,t is the error
term, and β0 to β4 are the regression coefficients.
To gain more insight in the way non-employer firms have
been affected by Uber in single years before and after their
market entry, I developed a second difference-in-differences
(DID) regression model. The underlying economic frame-
works assuming pre- and post-effects of Uber’s market entry
is a difference-in-differences regression estimated as follows:
Yc,t = β0 +
t=−1∑
t=−3
βt+4(Pre)c,t +
t=4∑
t=0
βt+4(Post)c,t
+ β2(Post ∗ 2010NonEmpShare)c,t
+ β3(Post ∗ EmpGrowth0610)c,t
+ β4(Post ∗ NonEmpGrowth0610)c,t
+αc + γt + εc,t
(4)
where all variables and subscripts remain the same as
in the previous framework except for the treatment dummy
which is now divided into a pre-treatment dummy–equal to
“1” if the observation is prior to Uber’s entry in counties Uber
has later entered and to “0” otherwise –and a post-treatment
dummy, equal to “1” if the observation is after Uber has en-
tered a county and equal to “0” otherwise. This estimation
was carried out both with and without post-treatment effects.
To ensure comparability of the pre- and post-entry effects
and investigate more dependent variables, I build two sets of
regressions where I add control variables to the regressions in
order to adjust the regression for the staggered market entry
of Uber and consider effects in the change in number of CBP
employees.75 These control variables also ensure that the co-
75Controlling for a variable is the attempt to reduce the effect of confound-
ing variables (correlated to the dependent and the independent variable) by
holding these variables constant for calculations made about the effect of
the independent variable on the dependent variable.
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efficients on the variables of interest do not suffer from omit-
ted variable bias (OVB).76 Thus, once conditioned on con-
trol variables, the regressing variables and the error term are
which uncorrelated which secures unbiased coefficients of re-
gression. This helps ensure the regression coefficient can be
interpreted as the best estimate of Uber’s impact.
For this purpose, I ran two separate DID regressions with
three different dependent variables, estimating the following
equations:
Yj,c,t =β0 + β1(Post) j,c,t
+ β2(Post ∗ 2010Count yEmp) j,c,t
+ β3(Post ∗ EmpGrowth0610) j=1,c,t
+α j,c + γ j,t + ε j,c,t
(5)
Yj,c,t =β0 +
t=−1∑
t=−3
βt+4(Pre) j,c,t +
t=4∑
t=0
βt+4(Post) j,c,t
+ β2(Post ∗ 2010Count yEmp) j,c,t
+ β3(Post ∗ EmpGrowth0610)J=1,c,t
+α j,c + γ j,t + ε j,c,t
with Yj,c,t =
 j=1: share of taxi non-empl. firms to all taxi employeesj=2: share of taxi non-employer firms to all firmsj=3: share of non-employer firms to all firms
(6)
where the independent variables (Pre) j,c,t and (Post) j,c,t
are time dummies with the value of “1” if the observation
is before/after Uber’s entry and “0” otherwise, and the post
treatment control variables (Post ∗ 2010Count yEmp) j,c,t
and (Post ∗ EmpGrowth0610) j,c,t are controlling for the
change in employment.77
By analogy to the previous frameworks, αc represents
county fixed effects γt year fixed effects. The unobserved
time-invariant differences between pre and post variables
being correlated with the independent variables makes the
fixed effects model for county and year a prudent choice.
This last set of DID regression models was also performed on
a more detailed industry breakdown of the dependent vari-
ables distinguishing between shares in the taxi and limou-
sine service industry (NAICS 4853) and shares in the ground
transportation service industry (NAICS 4859).
Inserting a proxy for independent work such as non-
employer firm prevalence in the regression remains just a
76A characteristic of control variables is that the expected value of the
error term with all the variables included is the same as it would be with
just the control variables. (E[εi,t |x1,t , x2,t , ...] = E[εi,t |x1,t , ...]). Control
variables are variables that are related to the dependent variable and their
effects need to be removed from the equation in order to correct endogeneity
problems and avoid biased regression coefficients. See Dougherty (2011).
77Note that the control variable employment growth from 2006 to 2010
is only included in the regression with the share of taxi non-employer firms
to all taxi employees as dependent variable (j=1).
proxy and just one variable. There is still some heterogene-
ity between treatment and control groups that is captured by
the error term and is correlated with my treatment indica-
tor. The question of impact and magnitude can be addressed
but exact correlations can’t be estimated since the error is
unobservable.
3.3.3. Impact of the rise of non-employer firms on unemploy-
ment rate
In the quest to better understand the impact of inde-
pendent work on labor supply and the drivers of the gig-
economy, I decided to take advantage of the constructed
dataset on non-employer firms to analyze whether online
labor-platforms are helping individuals out of unemployment
or cannibalizing jobs from employer firms. The hypothesis is
that the rate of unemployment declines with growth in the
number of non-employer firms.
The frameworks I developed to shed light on this matter
are based on the same methods as for examining the effects of
Uber’s market entry on non-employer firm prevalence. Fur-
thermore, I performed a set of OLS regressions to show the
causality of the proliferation of non-employer firms with the
unemployment rate.
The OLS regression estimating this correlation is de-
scribed as follows:
Yc,t =β0 + β1(NonEmpShare)c,t+
β2(Post ∗ EmpGrowth0610)c,t (7)
where the dependent variable Yc,t is the unemployment
rate, and the independent variable the share of non-employer
firms among all firms in the county at year t. The control vari-
ables composed of the dummy element Post and a growth
part with terms for logarithmic growth in employment, in
non-employer firms, and in labor force from 2006 to 2010.
As in the previous frameworks they are supposed to correct
endogeneity problems by removing unwanted effects corre-
lated with the denominator of the dependent variable.
4. Results: The Role of Non-Employer Firms in the Gig-
Economy
In this section, I investigate how data on non-employer
firms are related to the gig-economy and how it impacts la-
bor markets. I show that non-employer firms can be used
as an adequate proxy for independent work and treat them
as such to test their relevance in the case of Uber’s market
entry. In the next analyses, I employ a panel differences-in-
differences (DID) model approach78 to answer the primary
78Differences-in-differences is a quasi-experimental technique used to un-
derstand the effect of a sharp change in the economic environment. It is
used in conjunction with natural experiment in which nature does the ran-
domization. In this investigation the model is composed of cross-sectional
difference after Uber entry and a time-series difference within the industry
and state.
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questions about if and to what extent the entry of Uber has
impacted independent work, while controlling for differences
across time, state and industry. The resulting estimates allow
me to evaluate the relative impact on different metropolitan
areas across time and industry. After establishing this method
and central findings, I examine the growth decomposition of
non-employer firms to better understand the drivers of the
rise in independent work and connect the results to the pre-
diction of my theoretical approach. Finally, I present an ap-
proach to measuring aggregate effect of independent work
on unemployment and explore how gig worker characteris-
tics correlate with employment dynamics.
4.1. The Rise of Non-Employer Firms
Non-employer firms have undergone strong growth in the
last decade. The U.S. economy added almost 9 million non-
employer firms between 1997 and 2014, representing an in-
crease of 60%. By comparison the total U.S. payroll employ-
ment increased by 16 million, which is an increase of 12 %.
This observation aligns with the rise in self-employment mea-
sured by Katz and Krueger (2016b) as well as with more cur-
rent research from Jackson et al. (2017) who show that self-
employment’s increase is essentially due to sole proprietor-
ships providing labor services.79
Looking at trends over time, I find that the number of
both non-employer firms and employer firms have increased
at a similar and nearly steady rate from 1997 until 2007
and as shown in Figure 2 a major shift occurs in 2008.
Non-employer firms’ considerable growth continues along
the trend line whereas the number of employer firms from
the BDS experiences a significant drop of almost 7.5% in
only 3 years. The same discrepancy can be witnessed when
overlaying the number of non-employer’s and employer’s
employees (see appendix Figure 3). However, the latter
picks up again after 2010. This major shift, which is essen-
tially related to the financial crisis in 2007, has somehow not
affected non-employer firms. With this in mind, the ques-
tion can be raised whether some job holders have spilled
over to self-employment, which has been made easier due
to online platforms, and if the recent pick-up has come from
entrepreneurial activity.
A plot of employer firms’ share in total employment in
Figure 1 underpins the legitimacy of these questions. Em-
ployment has moved away from employer firms starting in
2001 and reaching an ultimate low in 2011. On the other
hand, the share of non-employer firms among total firms has
experienced an even stronger opposite effect increasing by
2 percentage points between 2005 and 2010 (see appendix
Figure 4). The trend in non-employer share aggregated over
all industries and states between 1999 and 2014 shows a
steep ascent between 2000 and 2005, raise the share of non-
employers in the total workforce from around 12 % to nearly
15 %. This increase may be caused by the appearance of the
79Cf. Jackson et al. (2017).
first platforms enabling contractors and freelancers to pro-
vide services over the internet. The second ascent occurs in
2009 when online labor platforms such as Uber first entered
the marketplace. This rise of 1.5 percentage points in only
one year brought the share of non-employer firms to 16.5 %
where it stabilized until 2014.
4.2. Tight Link between the Rise of Non-Employer Firms and
Alternative Work
The considerable increase in non-employer firms on one
side and the rise of alternative work arrangements described
by Katz and Krueger on the other, suggests that both are
somehow related. If this is true and if the correlation points
in the same direction, it would suggest that non-employer
firms are a suitable proxy for the lack of information on al-
ternative work arrangements between 2005 and 2015. They
can help measure the gig-economy and the magnitude of its
implications.
In fact, my findings show that the increase in the num-
ber of non-employer firms is tightly linked to the rise of al-
ternative work arrangements. The OLS regressions demon-
strate that a one standard deviation higher share of alterna-
tive work arrangements at the state and industry level be-
tween 2005 and 2014 is associated with a 0.3 increase in
the non-employer share. Nearly 48% of the increase in non-
employer share is explained by the change in the share of
alternative workers (see appendix Table 4). This finding is
highly significant (p≤ 0.001) and is sufficient to suggest that
non-employer firms are a good proxy for independent work-
ers described by alternative work arrangements.
Looking at self-employed contractors, who represent a
large share of the individuals working in the gig-economy
and compose a subgroup of alternative workers, we recog-
nize that the correlation is even stronger with a 0.4 standard-
deviation-increase in the change of non-employer share for
each standard deviation increase in the share of alternative
workers. The significance remains equally high (p ≤ 0.001).
The increase in non-employer firms is explained by 51 % of
the rise of self-employed contractors. This shows that the
change in the share of non-employer firms and the change in
the share of self-employed between 2005 and 2015 are highly
correlated. According to this, the logical conclusion is that
data on non-employer firms are an even better proxy for self-
employment than for all alternative work arrangements. In-
deed when looking at the correlations between non-employer
share and the share of other component groups of alterna-
tive work arrangements such as on-call workers, temporary
agency workers, and contractors, we observe that the rela-
tionships are not significant or even in the opposite direction
(see appendix Table 5).
Furthermore, the regression explains that in 2015 for
each standard deviation increase in alternative work arrange-
ments share–as well as self-employed share–non-employer
share rises by 0.6 standard deviations. This estimation is
explained by about 40 % of the data. If however the fixed
effects are incorporated in the model, over 91 % of the share
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in non-employer firms is explained by the share of alterna-
tive work or self-employed contractors. The correlation is
however weaker with a standardized regression coefficient
of 0.13 for alternative work arrangement share and 0.15 for
self-employed share.
As a consequence of these results, the null hypothesis
which assumes no increase in non-employer firms in states
and sectors where alternative work arrangements’ increase
is the largest, can be rejected with a high probability. Thus,
the findings are in favor of my initial hypotheses that non-
employer firms increase more in states and industries where
alternative work arrangements increase the most. And as
matter of fact, the percentage of non-employer firms to all
employees increase more when self-employment rises. This
shows that the number of individuals having reported work-
ing as self-employed in the Contingent Work Surveys in 2005
and 2015 is strongly correlated with the number of individ-
uals registered as non-employer firms.
Showing this correlation in the first part of my analysis
was therefore essential to provide evidence of the relevance
of non-employer firm data to compensate for the shortage of
information on independent work, clearing the way for fur-
ther investigations. As long as more detailed information on
independent work is lacking, the results of my analysis sug-
gest that non-employer firms data can be used as a proxy and
help measure the size of gig-work activity and furthermore
assess the implications on relevant economic issues.
4.3. Effects of Uber’s Market Entry on Non-Employer Firms
In the interest of achieving the highest possible degree of
statistical significance, it is not without reason that Uber was
chosen to demonstrate the relevance of non-employer firms
for the gig-economy. Uber made it easier for individuals to
work independently and leads the list of online platforms in
terms of prevalence and first market entry. Considering the
launch of Uber in Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as
a quasi-natural experiment for local labor markets, we can
conclude that non-employer firms are affected by this eco-
nomic treatment. If this is the case, it would provide evi-
dence that non-employer firms are relevant for measuring the
gig-economy and observing implications for labor markets.
The constructed dataset obtained from non-employer statis-
tics contains information on the number of non-employer
firms at a county level. This offers the opportunity to in-
vestigate at a commuting zone level, which is the significant
level for labor markets and the gig-economy. The Difference-
in-Differences regressions carried out to test whether non-
employer firms increase more in counties where Uber comes
in shows that Uber entry triggers an increase in the number
of non-employer firms relative to employment in the trans-
portation sector. The share of non-employer firms increases
when becoming an independent worker is easier. In fact, the
entry of Uber in a new metropolitan area is associated with
a 7 % to 12 % increase in the share of non-employer firms in
the transportation sector (see appendix Table 6). The over-
all coefficient of determination (R2 = 0.712) of the under-
lying regression expresses that 71.2 % of the change in the
share of non-employer firms in the transportation sector is
explained by the entry of Uber in the respective metropolitan
area. Intriguing is the consideration of each year around the
launch of Uber’s services (see appendix Table 6, column 2).
We can recognize that before Uber came into a local market,
only little to no statistical relationship could be witnessed; all
regression coefficients on year dummies are approximately
zero and all are insignificant. After Uber’s market entry, how-
ever, the correlation and the significance of Uber’s entry on
non-employer firms got stronger from year to year with an
increase of 2 % in non-employer firms share in the first post-
entry-year and 21 % increase and a p-value of less than 0.001
in the fourth year after market entry. One possible reason for
this steady growth could be the adoption time of potential
labors to use this new intermediary platform due to its sub-
ordination to network effects. A second reason could also be
the entry of similar platforms such as Lyft in the post-years of
Uber’s market entry which increases the number of options
for independent workers. These findings are obtained when
computing the change in non-employer share of the trans-
portation sector in yearly increments to the time-to-market
of Uber in the respective metropolitan area.80
Having taken out the difference to control the change in
employment and equalize the observations along their com-
mon dimensions (compare column 2 and 4 in Table 6), we
realize that the effect of Uber’s entry is even stronger with an
average of a 6 % increase (compared to 2 %) in non-employer
share in the taxi sector one year after Uber’s entry rising to
a 24.6 % increase (compared to 21 %) four years after the
launch and a significance level of p ≤ 0.001. These results
demonstrate clearly that after 2010 when Uber, one of the
first intermediary gig-platform in the transportation sector,
entered local markets the share of non-employer firms in-
creased significantly over the years. This finding is graphi-
cally well illustrated in Figure 8, which shows the regression
coefficients on each relative year (relative to Uber’s market
entry) dummy for non-employer share in the taxi industry.
From this graph can be read the percentage change of non-
employer share in the taxi industry from one year to another
in the 3 year period before and 4 years after Uber entering the
labor market. Only four years after the launch of this new-
comer disrupting the taxi industry, the graph shows a nearly
20 percentage point-increase compared to the time of market
entry and records a steady growth of non-employer firms in
that same time period. Splitting the taxi industry into its two
components taxi and limousine service (NAICS 4853) and
ground transportation service (NAICS 4859) we can observe
a difference in the impact of Uber (see appendix Figure 9).
While the taxi and limousine service branch is affected neg-
atively, the ground transportation service sector experiences
a significant increase. This contrast in the results may be ex-
plained by a sum of stacked phenomena. The first being a
partial spillover from the taxi branch to ground transporta-
tion services, i.e. that Uber has incited taxi drivers to work as
80I have only considered the metropolitan areas in which Uber is operative
and included in each area the corresponding counties at commuting level.
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independent workers for individual preferences leading them
to register as non-employer firm in the ground transporta-
tion service instead of the taxi and limousine service sector.
At this point it must also be pointed out that false or mis-
leading reporting of individuals can occur in both directions
which can increase or counteract to this phenomenon. Con-
sidering the higher rate of change in ground transportation
services (NAICS 4859) compared to taxi service sector, there
must also be another source of inflow coming from other in-
dustries or labor markets that leads to a higher increase of
this sector.
When jumping deeper into the matter and considering
the non-employer share of the taxi sector not only among
employees in the taxi industry but among all employees, the
results are even more distinctive. The level and rate of in-
crease are of course not as high as within the same industry
since it is diluted, however the effect is still remarkable. Table
7 shows the results for both dependent variables, taxi non-
employer firms as a share of all employees and non-employer
firms as a share of all firms. With a rise of nearly fourteen
times in the growth rate of taxi non-employer firms’ share in
all employees from 0.04 % in the year of entry to 0.6 % the
fourth year after, my findings show clearly that where Uber
has entered, the trend is noticeable even across broad indus-
tries. Figure 10 in the appendix illustrates the sharp increase
in coefficients in the years after market entry. Considering
the same coefficients for the non-employer share, displayed
in column 3 and 4 of the same table and plotted in appendix
Figure 11, it is clear that the rise of non-employer firm preva-
lence relative to all firms in the aftermath of Uber’s launch is
less sharp. However, it is still noticeable and goes beyond
the consideration of ride-hailing platforms and encompasses
other intermediaries that have popped up in other industries.
Looking at the plots of the average non-employer firm ratios
by year relative to Uber’s entry, we recognize a similar pat-
tern (see appendix Figure 12). More results of this analysis
are illustrated in the appendix, which, on account of their
secondary importance for the scope of this work, have not
necessitated further interpretation. These may, however, be
relevant for further research.
With the results presented above, I was able to verify the
initial hypothesis that the number of non-employer firms in-
creases more in metropolitan areas where Uber comes in, and
consequentially reject the null hypothesis of no increase. Ac-
curate measurement of non-employer firms is shown to be
important for understanding the magnitude and the impact
of the gig-economy. Many studies have used administrative
data for this purpose. Researchers from University of Mary-
land and the U.S. Census Bureau have used self-employment
data to analyze levels and trends of the gig-economy stat-
ing that they should expand the analysis with non-employer
firms.81 The only researchers having utilized non-employer
firms to try tracking the gig-economy were Hathaway and
Muro (2016). Having provided evidence for the relevance of
81Cf. Abraham et al. (2016).
non-employer firms in measuring the impact of online-labor
platform such as Uber, one can now utilize this source of in-
formation for investigations on economic issues.
4.4. Growth Decomposition of Non-Employer Firms
So far my findings suggest that the rise of non-employer
firms is an adequate proxy for compensating the shortage of
information on independent work and relevant for measur-
ing the impact of Uber’s market entry as an example for on-
line labor platforms on gig worker’s activity. In the light of
the conclusion drawn from these findings, it is necessary to
scrutinize the decomposition of the change in non-employer
share.82 The intention is to rule out the influence of driv-
ing forces stemming from Other state and industry charac-
teristics. If the change in non-employer share is driven by a
specific industry or state with a historically higher sensitivity
or disposition to more non-employer firms it could mislead
and distort the explanation of the growth in non-employer
firms. The one question that needs to be answered to under-
stand the decomposition of growth is the following: is the
change in non-employer share due to the expansion of in-
dustries or states with historically more non-employer firms?
To do so, I decomposed the difference in non-employer share
into (1) between-state-sector growth, (2) within-state-sector
growth, and (3) a covariance verifying the validity of the
analysis. Furthermore, I carried out the analysis at differ-
ent industry levels characterized by the 2-, 3-, and 4-digit
NAICS code to gain more detailed findings. In order to wit-
ness interim development during 2000 and 2014, I split the
time frame into two periods. The results are illustrated in Ta-
ble 8.83 The decomposition of the change in non-employer
share between and within state-sectors shows that the rise
of non-employer firms is not driven by differentials in sector
or state growth. This can be seen in the three columns “To-
tal Change”, “Between”, and “Within” displayed in the table.
The “Within” column shows the negligibility of both cross-
industry and inter-state spill-overs in independent worker
growth, with values around zero. The covariance can be used
to verify that the difference in share for the corresponding pe-
riod equals the sum of the "Between", the "Within", and the
"Covariance" columns thus validating the conformity with the
total change. These findings helps to understand that the rise
of the gig-economy is not driven by a specific industry such
as the transportation sector spilling over into other industries
or a specific State with favorable conditions for independent
workers. On the contrary, the rise of independent workers is
not influenced by cross-industry nor inter-state spill-overs.
This analysis measuring labor supply elasticities between
states and industries to changes in the exposure to online
platforms with the example of Uber, indicates that the rise
of non-employer firms is not mechanically driven by differ-
ential industry or regional growth. In view of the conclu-
sion drawn from these findings, we can use the constructed
82Share of non-employer firms to total employment.
83A more detailed table with NAICS 3- and 4-digit industry levels is acces-
sible in appendix Table 9.
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dataset matching non-employer firms and alternative work
arrangements with other administrative data to shed light on
the implications arising within the labor market.
4.5. Unemployment and the Impact of Non-Employer Firms
One of the most important domestic issues economists
and governments have to deal with when making decisions
on labor policies is the level of unemployment. In general,
the question is less about the consequences of unemploy-
ment but rather about the causes for unemployment and
the economic mechanics that maintains a low unemployment
rate. Having in mind that employment or work arrange-
ments based on the traditional employee-employer relation-
ship have declined in the last decade (see appendix Figure 14
and Figure 16), and self-employment or independent work
measured in both alternative work arrangements and non-
employer firms has recorded a significant increase84, the re-
sult that the emergence of online platforms is reallocating
workers in one direction is not surprising. When looking at
data on unemployment, we recognize a similar trend as with
employment. Unemployment rate has skyrocketed in the
years after the financial crisis to a record high of nearly 10%
since the beginning of the second millennium and dropped
back to 6 % after 2010 (see Figure 15). Certainly, this trend is
highly correlated with the 2007 financial crisis, but nonethe-
less the decline in unemployment may also have been af-
fected by the digitization of work. Falling back on the case
of Uber and isolating the trend of unemployment rate in
metropolitan areas where Uber is operating, we observe the
same drop as in the whole U.S. labor market (see Figure 17).
This premise raises two fundamental questions underlining
the impact of online platforms on labor dynamics: by lower-
ing barriers to entry in certain sectors and offering income op-
portunities for low skill services, are platforms allowing peo-
ple to work when they would otherwise be unemployed? By
improving the match between supply and demand are plat-
forms increasing total labor supply and lowering unemploy-
ment, or simply shifting individuals from traditional jobs to
online platform jobs?
Knowing that we can now use non-employer firms to as-
sess socio-economic matters and labor-related impact of the
gig-economy, I examined the correlation between the rise of
non-employer firms and the evolution of unemployment rate.
The findings are illustrated in Table 10 and show that con-
trary to my initial assumption the unemployment rate is pos-
itively correlated to the rise of non-employer firms. In fact,
each percentage point change in non-employer share is asso-
ciated with an 0.08 increase in percentage change in unem-
ployment rate. This well-fitted estimate indicates that about
88% of the increase in unemployment rate is explained by the
rise of non-employer firms. However, examining Uber’s im-
pact on unemployment rate, shown in Table 11, only a weak
correlation with a low significance in year four after market
entry can be detected.
84Cf. Katz and Krueger (2016a); Chapter 2.4 and Chapter 4.1.
The results of estimating a regression are plotted by year
in Figure 18, which shows the correlation between the depen-
dent variable unemployment rate and the predicting variable
non-employer share for each year between 2006 and 2014.
It clearly shows the weak correlation between these two vari-
ables preventing me from rejecting the null hypothesis that
the change in the share of non-employer firms has no effect
on unemployment rate. Thus, there is no evidence that the
gig-economy is contributing to a decline in unemployment
since the unemployment rate is increasing with the rise in
non-employer share. A variety of explanations can be posited
for the positive correlation of non-employer firms and unem-
ployment rate. One arguable explanation is that unemploy-
ment raises the likelihood that workers transition to indepen-
dent work as opposed to a traditional employment relation-
ship and therefore the share of non-employer firms increases
in counties and industries where unemployment is high. It
changes the perspective of the guiding question, which is
no longer about the correlation between non-employer share
and unemployment rate but rather a causality issue. Is un-
employment increasing because of the gig-economy or is the
gig-economy prevailing because of the high unemployment
rate? This reasoning suggests that non-employer firms are
not the cause for a higher unemployment rate. It is more
likely that whenever high joblessness prevails, workers with
little bargaining power and few options for traditional em-
ployment turn to self-employment indicating a weak labor
market. This counterintuitive explanation would be in line
with a recent paper published by Katz and Krueger built on
their previous work on alternative work arrangements.85
5. Conclusion
5.1. Summary
For the past several years there has been much research
done on the rise and the significance of the so called “gig-
economy”, work activities enabled by online platforms and
characterized by temporary positions filled by independent
contractors on a short-term basis. However, existing studies
provide little evidence of the magnitude and the manifesta-
tion of its impact on labor markets. Public institutions such
as the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) have ceased tracking
data on alternative work arrangements and other agencies
are not well positioned to capture information. Some re-
searchers have tried to fill the void by using tax records infor-
mation on self-employment, others have worked with com-
pany data or even carried out own surveys.86 In this work, I
provide quantitative responses to the questions of how the
size and the growth of the gig-economy can be measured
and how labor markets respond to the exposure to online
platforms using data on non-employer firms from the U.S.
85Cf. Katz and Krueger (2016b).
86See among others Katz and Krueger (2016a); Burtch et al. (2016);
Gierten and Spiezia (2016); Hathaway and Muro (2016); Abraham et al.
(2016); Chen et al. (2017); De Stefano (2016); Jackson et al. (2017).
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Census Bureau and on the staggered market entry of Uber in
different U.S. metropolitan areas.
I begin by describing the contextual setting of the re-
search subject and illustrating the scope of work. First, I
define the online platform economy as economic activities
involving online intermediaries that are marked by four char-
acteristics: (1) they provide a digital market space that con-
nects workers or sellers directly to customers, (2) they allow
people to work on a flexible basis,87 (3) they pay on a piece-
rate basis for a single task or good at a time, and (4) they
intermediate or facilitate payment for the good or service. I
then distinguish between labor and capital platforms. Labor
platforms, such as Uber, connect customers with contingent
workers who perform discrete tasks or projects while capital
platforms, such as Airbnb, connect customers with individu-
als who rent assets or sell goods peer-to-peer. Both are very
distinct from each other. As independent work activities only
occur through the intermediary of labor platforms, I narrow
down my definition of the gig-economy to work activities fa-
cilitated by online labor-platforms and further distinguish be-
tween crowdwork and on-demand work. Both are different
in the location where the work can be carried out. While
crowdwork can be done remotely or digitally like designing
a website, on-demand work can only be carried out at a local
level, like a ride-hail service. Finally, I define gig workers as
individuals in an alternative work arrangement earning in-
come by providing services to a customers in a local area ac-
quired through the intermediary of an online labor-platform.
After unveiling the difficulties in measuring the size and
the change of the gig-economy workforce, I describe the con-
struction of my datasets and the econometric frameworks
used in my analyses. I then proceed with documenting the
trend in the rise of non-employer firms and discover a strong
growth. The U.S. economy increased by 60% adding al-
most 9 million non-employer firms between 1997 and 2014.
By comparison, the total U.S. payroll employment increased
by 16 million which represents a growth by 12%. In or-
der to evaluate the role of non-employer firms as part of
the gig-economy, I then build the observation variable “non-
employer share” defined as the percentage of non-employer
firms to all employees, which becomes the key element of my
analyses.
In a first stage, I build on previous research by Katz and
Krueger (2016b) who provide new survey data on alter-
native work arrangements to show the relevance of non-
employer firms as a proxy for the rise of independent work.
By means of ordinary least square estimations, I compare
the rise in non-employer firms to the rise of alternative work
arrangements and show that non-employer firms increase
most where the increase is largest in alternative work data
from 2015 Katz and Krueger compared to BLS data from
2005. Indeed, one standard deviation higher change in al-
87Recent industry reports indicate that online platform economy workers
vary their hours considerably. In any given week, 65 percent of Uber drivers
change the number of hours by more than 25 percent. See Hall and Krueger
(2015).
ternative work arrangements is associated with a 0.3 to 0.4
increase in the change in non-employer share at the indus-
try*state level. This provides evidence that the growth of
non-employer firms between 2005 and 2015 is correlated
with the growth in alternative work.
In a second stage, I grasp at data on the staggered entry
of Uber in local markets and use differences-in-differences
techniques to show the significance of non-employer firms in
the emergence of online platforms. I find that non-employer
firms are tightly linked to the rise of independent work. Uber
triggers an increase of 20 ppt in non-employer firms rela-
tive to employment in the transportation sector 4 years af-
ter entering local labor markets. Uber’s entry is also associ-
ated with a 0.05 to 0.07 increase in non-employer share in
the transportation sector. This proves that the rise of non-
employer firms is tightly linked to the workforce evolution in
the gig-economy which increases when becoming indepen-
dent is easier.
I also explore whether the change in non-employer share
is due to the expansion of industries or due states with his-
torically more non-employer firms. For this, I decompose the
change in non-employer share into tree terms (1) between
industry sector or state growth term, (2) within industry sec-
tor or state growth term, and (3) a covariance term. I find out
that the rise of non-employer firms is not mechanically driven
by differential industry or regional growth. This also means
that there are no spillovers of non-employer firms from one
industry to another or one state to another along the growth
of independent work.
Finally, I investigate whether the gig-economy has had
a positive impact on employment by improving the match
between supply and demand. With the help of adminis-
trative data from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics
(LAUS), I examined the correlation between the rise of non-
employer firms and the evolution of unemployment rate and
surprisingly found that the unemployment rate is, albeit only
slightly and insignificantly, positively correlated to the rise of
non-employer firms. In fact, each percentage point change
in non-employer share is associated with a 0.08 percentage
point increase in unemployment rate. In the transportation
sector, Uber’s market entry indicates that unemployment
raises the likelihood that workers transition to independent
work as opposed to a traditional employment relationship
and therefore the share of non-employer firms increases in
counties and industries where unemployment is high. This
reasoning suggests that it is more likely that whenever high
joblessness prevails, workers with little bargaining power
and few options for traditional employment turn to self-
employment.
5.2. Inferences
This work’s findings contribute to both the literature on
patterns in the gig-economy’s workforce and research issues
on labor market evolution. At the same time, it offers a new
perspective of the available data that can be considered to in-
vestigate trends in independent work and the implications of
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the gig-economy on socio-economic issues. My results high-
light the catalyzing effects of online labor-platforms on inde-
pendent work as integral part of these new work activities.
The gig-economy’s size does not appear overwhelming, but
its growth is remarkably rapid. In recent years non-employer
firms, a proxy of independent workers in the gig-economy,
have started growing much more quickly than before the ad-
vent of much of the current online platform services.
While the gig-economy may create accessible, flexible,
and convenient work opportunities for contractors, it may
also be operating outside of various economic stabilizers such
as labor market regulations, work legislation, tax policies,
insurance coverage, and social benefits.88 Since most gig-
economy workers are considered independent contractors,
not employees, they do not qualify for basic protections like
overtime pay and minimum wages, or other employment
benefits such as mandatory workplace training and social se-
curity. This challenges stakeholders and policymakers to pri-
oritize economic stabilizers as they relate to a growing num-
ber of non-standard work arrangements. Without data on
how online platforms are affecting work activities, policy-
makers are flying blind into the gig-economy. Understanding
the magnitude and implications of the collaborative economy
can help develop policy standards and support the workforce
of tomorrow’s labor markets. With this work, I provide quan-
titative responses to help understand the gig-economy and
bring a new pool of workers to the forefront of the debate
that suits the nature of the evolution of labor markets.
Future studies with non-employer firms data have already
been announced.89 As I was able to show that non-employer
firms are a good proxy for independent workers, this the-
sis now allows the reflection on how future studies should
be considering non-employer firms to obtain a better under-
standing of the occupational change in work behavior and
labor markets in the gig-economy. Information captured by
household surveys or in administrative data on gig workers
is poor and incomplete. Knowing that non-employer statis-
tics can fill the lack of information on independent work, re-
searchers are now given a new source of data to obtain a bet-
ter picture of the trends in gig workers activities. Thus, this
work wipes out one of the major insecurities arising from the
gig-economy, which is the inability of measuring its magni-
tude and growth. Researchers and other interested parties,
also have the data availability to gain insights that go be-
yond the scope of this work. While my analyses is limited
to a defined research question and a set of publicly available
knowledge, federal institutions and other researchers have
their own related research projects for which they can use
the datasets created in the course of this thesis.
Non-employer firms are far from being a perfect measure
because they are not entirely congruent to workers in the gig-
economy. By nature, employment in the gig-economy is im-
possible to measure using traditional statistics, as there is no
specific measure of individuals using online platforms for gig
88Cf. Hargrove and Mazerolle (2016).
89Cf. Abraham et al. (2016).
work. However, non-employer firms are a useful proxy and
until governmental institutions design more targeted mea-
sures to monitor the growth of gig employment, the Census
Bureau’s non-employer firms may be the best measure avail-
able.
5.3. Outlook
This thesis was carried out at the Finance Faculty of the
MIT Sloan School of Management as part of a broader ongo-
ing research project on independent work, reported income,
and the effects of the online platform economy on labor mar-
kets. One objective of this research was to provide new tab-
ulations that will inform the ability of non-employer firms
data to track and detect new patterns. This analysis helps
identify and assess how the dynamics in alternative work ar-
rangements relates with working relationship, contractors’
situation, and other aspects of labor markets due to the ex-
posure to online platforms. The second objective of the re-
search project, is to understand why individual use these new
types of employment. Some possible reasons could be (1)
the change in risk management preferences by workers, (2)
technology improvements that allow for efficient allocation
of human capital, or (3) regulatory arbitrage that allow firms
to reduce labor cost.
In order to investigate these explanations the next steps
would be to take advantage of the findings on non-employer
firms and identify the drivers of the rise in independent work
on both the supply and demand side of the labor market. A
starting point would be to understand the effect that online
platforms have on independent work income. In this context
a first hypothesis should be that platforms allow individuals
to divide and reshuffle their labor across various employers
more efficiently. Individuals might be enticed to do so either
to maximize their income or to mitigate labor income risk
across various employers. The second explanation could be
addressed by hypothesizing that technology allows for a bet-
ter time allocation, leads to a cut in coordination costs, and
lowers barriers to entry in certain sectors. The third expla-
nation should be investigated by testing if the firms provid-
ing online platforms are doing so to arbitrage regulation and
lower their labor costs. Another question that is worth inves-
tigating with non-employer firms data is the preferences of
individuals in the gig-economy which could be explained by
identifying the correlation with socio-demographic patterns.
To quantify the relevance of each of these hypotheses, further
longitudinal data can be used such as income reported on the
1099 MISC form and made available by the IRS or employ-
ment insurance and minimum wage data obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics among others. With this, one can
also further examine the aggregate effect of online platforms
on resource allocation, labor supply, and entrepreneurial ac-
tivity.
Labor markets are being disrupted by technological ad-
vancements resulting in the polarization of income distri-
bution and job destruction due to automation and other
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trends.90 I believe that studying the effect of online platforms
on the efficiency of labor markets using real economic exper-
iments is crucial to understand the structural trends affecting
our economies and a diligent way to nurture evidence-based
decision making for the healthy socio-economic develop-
ment of our workplace and society. How digital technologies
are reforming our work activities will continue to be a key
question for policymakers and an exciting motivation for
researchers.
90Cf. Autor (2015).
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